Let's see if I can clarify my muddy writing from very, very early this morning.

> Again I agree, and I had this point in mind when I initially wrote about science implying the existence of an external, objective reality. At the same time, though, I find these claims to be a bit different from other non-rational claims. For starters, pretty much every belief system that has any purpose must also assume that an external reality exists. I grant that we can conceive, intellectually, of belief systems in which the opposite was assumed. I also grant that these contrived beliefs would be as deductively valid as our belief in the scientific method. Practically speaking, however, they're completely worthless and adhered to by almost nobody. While this doesn't disprove them (the entire quandry is that we can't prove or disprove most low-level assumptions about reality), I'm also not too concerned with them.


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> The belief that a relationship between cause and effect will hold, however, I believe is a higher level one than the assumption that an observable, external reality exists. We can now make observations about this reality. Indeed, humans have made a lot of observations about reality during recorded history. Is there any compelling evidence to suggest that the fundamental laws which govern reality have ever changed? I know of no instance in which cause and effect simply stopped working. Is it possible that they could? Sure. But there's no evidence to suggest they ever will, nor any conceivable mechanism by which they would. Occam's Razor suggests we treat it the idea that cause and effect will always be linked as more probable than the idea that they are not permanetly linked.

Good enough. I would agree that the cause-effect claim is a higher-order claim than the external world claim. And I also agree, to a point, that such claims are "a bit different" from other non-rational claims. My point here was actually very minor, that being that they are still assumptions, and there is no rational way to prove or disprove them. Of course the law of cause and effect has never failed, that we know of, and we have no evidence that it will fail; however, we also have no evidence one way or the other, and our only experience with the law, "that it has always been so", is no reason in itself to accept that it will always hold. It is not Ockham's razor that mandates that we accept the law of cause and effect, but rather mere practicality; science is worthless for extrapolation to the future (induction) without assuming it. It remains, however, an assumption, even if it is ridiculous or impossible to refuse its force.

> frum, you've lost me. Could you provide some examples of specific theories widely held by trained scientists that are as inherently unreasonable as those of astrologers? I agree, of course, that there are misapplications of science all the time, but I can't help but feel the above paragraph paints the "scientific community" with an overly broad brush.

I tried to be tentative here, but it seems that I have failed. What I am pointing out is primarily that the word "science" can be misapplied, as you agree. I do not mean to paint the scientific community with a broad brush, as the majority of scientists are merely doing science proper, using the method to make or break hypotheses about the world, and apply their conclusions. I bring this up not to disparage theory-making in general, but simply to emphasize that some (some)'scientific' theories have almost as tenuous a link with reason as the superstitions you deny, and more importantly, some (some) theories are just as dogmatically opposed to contrary evidence. These theories are not many, and they are often controversial, and I did not want to hijack the topic by tangentally forcing it into a discussion of the particular theories I have in mind. The point is more narrow than it seemed in my post.

> I can't really think to reply to all of this right now (it's nearly 3 a.m. and my head is pounding). frum's exact point here is also slightly lost on me. Let me tackle a few important points I see:
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> 1) Constantly re-evaluating our beliefs about people is admittedly silly. I do think that we should be able to incorporate new evidence about a person into our view of that person without re-evaluating all of our beliefs about that person. Strong evidence that suggests the person is radically different than we thought, however, should probably require us to rethink our views on that person.
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> If the cops show me three people who saw my friend Tom leaving the scene of a murder shortly after it happened, and they show me the gun used to commit the murder was Tom's and had his fingerprints on it, you can be damned sure I'm going to re-evaluate my friendship with Tom. There's no direct evidence that he's a murderer, and he may have had justifiable reasons for doing it if he did. I'm still going to be uncomfortable around him. This is smart. It would not be smart to ignore the evidence and say, "Well, I've known him in the past and he'd never do something like that."
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> 2) As frum points out, trust can be stretched. But this requires us to be suspicious. If I suspect my wife is having an affair, it would be bad to divorce her. But it would be smart to be more observant to her behavior now, to look for clues, etc. This is in some way a reevaluation of my beliefs about her. I'm not saying that we need to throw out our beliefs the instant some contrary evidence comes along, but we should be willing to temper our beliefs and perhaps apply the sword of skepticism to them a bit more liberally than normal when contradicting evidence turns up.

We are agreed on 1 and 2. I think that I overstated my case in the example. What I meant was that the scientific method, when used properly, should incorporate all evidence and follow it, especially if it is contrary to the hypothesis. The best way to prove a hypothesis is to try to disprove it and then fail. But taking every scrap of evidence against a person one already trusts would be, as you say, rather silly. But I was merely pointing out what you clearly already understand.
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> 3) I think I agree on the God thing, assuming I'm reading it right. Having yet to find proof for God's existence, though, I am still in the latter category of people. I do hope that were I to be religious, I would still examine and be skeptical about my religious beliefs. Again, this doesn't mean abandoning them every time I see what appears to be contradicting evidence, but that I'm willing to modify them when good, repeatable evidence becomes known to me.

Good enough. My point was that religious dogma often has a character that requires that it not be abandoned with the same ruthlessness that we should properly apply to hypotheses about the workings of the world. Of course we should still examine our beliefs, but faith and relationship with God require that we (well, not we, but me) be much more stringent in our acceptance of contrary evidence. This does not hold in all cases, but for some, it does, as you already know.
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> Stephen

frum